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Beauty Queens and Battling Knights: 
Risk Taking and Attractiveness in Chess
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We explore the relationship between attractiveness and risk taking in chess. We use a large 
international panel dataset on chess competitions which includes a control for the players’ 
skill in chess. This data is combined with results from a survey on an online labor market 
where participants were asked to rate the photos of 626 expert chess players according to 
attractiveness. Our results suggest that male chess players choose significantly riskier 
strategies when playing against an attractive female opponent, even though this does not 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Risk preferences are typically studied from situations in which individuals make decisions in 
isolation. In many instances, however, one individual’s risk taking has consequences on the 
outcome of another individual, as in the case of competitions where decisions involve risk. To 
what extent characteristics of one  individual affect risk taking by another individual is 
relatively unexplored. In particular, little is known about the role of physical traits on risk 
taking. In this paper we focus on attractiveness. In practice, it can be hard to get reliable data 
on outcomes regarding risk and attractiveness. Options as well as outcomes are not always 
easily defined when decisions are made outside of the laboratory, and as Eckel and Wilson 
(2004) discuss, physical appearance could be used as a heuristic when people try to form an 
opinion about an unfamiliar individual’s ability and characteristics. It can therefore be a 
challenge to disentangle attractiveness from for example beliefs about ability. We argue that 
the data used in this paper enables us to disentangle the specific effect of attractiveness on risk 
taking, by allowing us to study relevant outcome variables while controlling for aspects such 
as ability. Such information is publicly available, which means that the subjects studied in this 
study do not have to use attractiveness as a proxy for another individual’s ability. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the role of attractiveness in chess, by linking it to 
risk taking. In particular, we examine whether people use riskier strategies against attractive 
people, whether this affects performance, and whether men and women react to attractiveness 
in the same way. In order to test this, we use a large international panel dataset on chess 
tournaments which includes controls for the players’ age, gender, nationality, risk 
taking/aggressiveness and playing strength, measured by cumulative performance. We use 
photos of some of these chess players and have them rated according to attractiveness by 
participants recruited through an online labor market. To increase the reliability of our 
findings, we use two independent measures of risk taking. The fact that they lead to very 
similar findings strengthens the results substantially.  
Our results suggest that male chess players choose significantly riskier strategies the 
more attractive the female opponent they are playing against. Women, however, do not react 
to the attractiveness of their opponents. Moreover, riskier play against an attractive female 
opponent has no positive impact on performance, which implies that economic rationality is 
unlikely to be the reason for the increased risk taking against attractive female opponents. 
Finally, we find some weak indications of more attractive players of both sexes choosing 
more risky strategies than less attractive players.    3 
The chess data set, which contains information on international chess games 
performed by expert chess players, enables us to analyze strategic interactions between people 
with substantial experience in the task. These objective and observational data are combined 
with survey responses for 626 chess players who were subjectively rated for physical 
attractiveness. Each photo received about 50 independent ratings. Approximately half of the 
chess players of whom we have photos were women.  
Using the same chess data as in this study, Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) found that 
men use riskier strategies than women, and that this gap is especially large when men play 
against women. Part of our goal in this study is to further our understanding of the cause of 
these effects, that might also occur in other domains than chess. That men take more risk than 
women in general is a well-documented finding (see e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009 or Eckel 
and Grossman 2008 for reviews of this literature), but as far as we know, the relationship 
between attractiveness and risk taking has not been studied before.  
The contribution of this paper is thus two-fold. First, we contribute to the literature on 
the determinants of risk taking. Besides having the playing strength of both players, as well as 
demographic characteristics, the data allow us to include a measure of the stake of each game 
played. The tournaments are an environment which is highly competitive thus a priori we 
don’t expect people to change their behavior due to characteristics of their opponents which 
are not relevant for the game. Thus we believe that the effect size of attractiveness on the 
behavior of male players provide us with a lower bound of how attractiveness affects male 
risk taking in general. 
Second, we contribute to the growing  literature on the role of attractiveness for 
decision making  and economic outcomes. The  positive correlation between physical 
attractiveness and wages, as well as other labor market outcomes, is a well-established result 
in the social and economic literature (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and Hamermesh 
1998).
1
                                                 
1 Beauty has also been related to electoral success (e.g., Berggren et al. 2010). 
 As Fletcher (2008) notes, the reasons for a “beauty premium” in the labor market are 
largely unknown, as it might be caused by various forms of discrimination (either by 
employers or customers), or by self-selection to occupations where there is a higher reward 
for physical attractiveness. In addition, it has been found that more attractive people have 
better verbal skills, which could be useful when searching/negotiating for a job or for school 
performance (Mobius and Rosenblatt 2006).  Experiments  on social preferences have also 
shown that physically attractive people are seen to be more cooperative in the public goods   4 
game (Andreoni and Petrie 2008), are given higher offers in the ultimatum game but are also 
demanded of more (Solnick and Schweitzer 1999), and are trusted more in the trust game 
(Wilson and Eckel 2006) than less attractive people. Combined, these results suggest that 
physical appearance could impact social stratification and the distribution of opportunities.
2
There are also previous examples of how the attractiveness of others affects men’s and 
women’s decision making differently. For example, Wilson and Daly (2004) show that men 
become more impatient when seeing an attractive woman than when seeing a less attractive 
woman, whereas women’s behavior is not affected by whether a male is attractive or not.
  
3
When considering attractiveness in the labor market, for instance at a job interview, it 
could be used as a proxy for health. An unhealthy individual may very well look less 
attractive and a lower degree of attractiveness could therefore indicate lower productivity. 
Thus, when an employer chooses an attractive job applicant it does not have to be due to the 
fact that the applicant is attractive but rather because he or she signals a high level of health 
and productivity. The most obvious advantage with using chess data is the Elo rating which is 
a  recurrently updated objective measure of a player’s chess skill.
 In 
a field experiment on door-to-door charitable fundraising, Landry et al. (2006) find that male 
charitable donor prospects respond more than female prospects to female solicitor 
attractiveness. In another field experiment where mail with varying content (advertising 
content, loan price and loan offer deadlines) is sent out to former clients of a large consumer 
lender, Bertrand et al. (2010) find that when seeing the photo of an attractive woman in the 
ad, male clients take up significantly more loans whereas women do not react to the attractive 
woman nor to an attractive man. The effect for male borrowers is substantial: the presence of 
the female photo increases loan demand similarly to a 25 percent decrease in the interest rate. 
4  Thus  the fact that 
attractiveness may signal health status is not a problem here.
5
                                                 
2 See also Mulford et al. (1998, p. 1587) for similar findings. 
  
3 Daly and Wilson (2004) suggest that this gender difference could be due to the fact that men but not women 
found attractive photos to be arousing and that this arousal activated neural mechanisms associated with cues of 
mating opportunity. Another study focusing on time preferences and sexual cues among men only suggests that 
it is not about mating opportunity per se but rather about the role of an activated general reward circuitry (Van 
den Bergh et al. 2008).
4 See “Arpad Elo and the Elo Rating System” by Daniel Ross  for a more detailed 
discussion on the Elo rating.  
4 See “Arpad Elo and the Elo Rating System” by Daniel Ross for a more detailed discussion on the Elo rating.  
5 It could be the case that people use attractiveness as some type of heuristic for how their opponent will play. 
However, this does not explain why attractiveness only matters for how male players play against women.    5 
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and statistics 
and Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4 presents the results of the 
estimations and Section 5 concludes and discusses promising directions for future research.  
 
2   DATA 
In this study we exploit two datasets: an observational dataset from international expert chess 
games stretching over a period of 11 years with approximately 100,000 games, and a dataset 
resulting from 61 online surveys with approximately 2,000 participants.  
The observational data were obtained from ChessBase 10  which is a database 
collection for chess players. For each player there is information available on their name, year 
of birth, nationality and gender. For every game there are data on the names and Elo-ratings 
of the two players (where Elo ratings indicate playing strength), year when the game was 
played, number of moves and the score, i.e. the outcome of a game in terms of a win, loss or 
draw. In this study we include games played between 1997 and 2007 where the minimum 
Elo-rating for each included player is set to 2000, above which players are considered to be 
experts. The measures of risk taking are explained in detail in the next section. The players 
come from 140 countries though most originate in Europe or in the former Soviet Union (see 
Section 4). Due to the fact that the data contain information on both the player in focus and 
the opponent it is possible to study the specific interaction of these two players as well as all 
other games each player has played or plays subsequently. The panel data structure allows us 
to control for individual fixed effects which account for time constant differences.  
The online survey was carried out through the crowdsourcing web service Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where participants log on to an internet account to do tasks that 
require human intelligence to complete (a task on MTurk is called a “HIT”, which stands for 
Human Intelligence Task) for which they receive small payments. In our case, participants 
could voluntarily agree to fill out surveys for which they were paid $0.50 for each survey.
6
                                                 
6 See Horton et al. (2010) and Paolacci et al. (2010) and references therein for research on MTurk surveys. Note 
also that the typical worker on MTurk is willing to work for about $1.40 per hour (Horton and Chilton in press). 
 
One individual was allowed to participate in several different surveys, but only to rate a given 
photo once. Each survey contained ten to twelve photos, and the survey was assumed to take 
about eight minutes to fill out. In practice, the average time spent filling out the survey was 
five to six minutes. All data were collected during one week in September of 2010. The 
participants were required to have a HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 95 percent   6 
(which implies that  at least 95%  of their previous HITs were to the satisfaction of their 
employer) as well as to be in the US. It has previously been shown that the population on 
MTurk  is at least as representative of the US population as traditional subject pools 
(Buhrmester et al. in press, Paolacci et al. 2010). 
In each survey, half of the photos were of male chess players and half of female 
players.
7 The order in which these photos were presented to each rater was randomized. We 
use an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (Not at all attractive) to 10 (Very attractive).
8
As photos were not available for all players in the dataset we selected a subgroup of 
the total population. We call this subgroup the MTurk sample. The photos used in the survey 
were chosen for players who were between 25 and 34 years old in the year 2010. The photos 
sampled were taken between 1997 and 2007, and most of them are headshots. There were 
more male players with photos available than female players so we selected all female players 
between the age of 25 and 34 with photos as well as all male players from every third year 
within that range who had photos. This resulted in approximately the same number of female 
and male photos.    
 
Participants were asked to give a rating for each photo on this scale. Each photo was rated 
about 50 times. We also asked the participants for their gender, age, nationality, education and 
labor force situation. See the Appendix for some descriptives on the raters. On average about 
60 percent of the raters were women, and the average age was 35. 
 
3   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
To measure risk behavior we use two independent approaches which we believe are good 
proxies for economic risk, where risk aversion implies choosing the safer alternative rather 
then gambling for the same expected payoff. The first measure builds on the choice of chess 
opening strategy where the players can choose between a risky, neutral or safe strategy. The 
second measure exploits the existence of draws in chess as a draw gives half a point with 
certainty rather than gambling for a win with the risk of losing.  
There are three possible results in chess: a win, a draw and a loss which gives one point, 
half a point and zero points respectively. When a chess game starts it is in a “saddle point 
equilibrium”, i.e. a draw with half a point for each player. When two equally strong players 
                                                 
7 It is unlikely that the raters recognized any of the chess players they rated, since even though some of these 
players might be well known in the chess world, they are typically unknown outside of their field. 
8 We ask the participants the following question: “Physical attractiveness: How physically attractive do you find 
this person, on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 is "Not at all attractive" and 10 is "Very attractive"?”.   7 
meet, the probability for a draw is higher than in cases when the players are of different 
playing strength. To increase the winning probability a player must accept a higher level of 
risk which reduces the drawing probability and increases the winning/losing probabilities. 
Figure 1 shows two examples of opening choices where the first example is more risky as it 
leads to a smaller drawing probability and higher winning/losing probabilities. The second 
example is a more risk averse choice as the drawing probability is greater.  
 
Figure 1 – Outcome probabilities for wins, draws and losses (from white perspective) for two 
opening strategies based on real game data (a Sicilian defence where the starting moves 1.e4-










In chess, the term aggressive play is used when indicating a strategy that reduces the 
drawing probability while the term solid play is used to indicate a strategy that reduces the 
winning/losing probabilities. 
 
Risk as measured by the choice of opening strategy 
At the beginning of a chess game, both players choose an opening strategy (a strategic 
development scheme for their pieces) that will steer the game towards a style of play that best 
suits him or her at the same time as they try to make the style of play less comfortable for the 
opponent. All expert chess players have a prepared set of opening strategies to be used in 
different situations. One’s chosen set of openings is called an “opening repertoire” (OR). To 
optimize performance, considerable effort is dedicated to create an opening repertoire that 
matches one’s personality.  
A risky opening strategy involves a higher level of risk, as launching an attack on one 
part of the board implies that you neglect another. Typically, in such positions every move 
                                                 
9  The percentages and images are taken from 
http://www.chessgames.com/perl/explorer?node=32033&move=2&moves=e4.c5&nodes=21720.32033 
32 %  34.7 %  33.3 % 
34.7 %  20.1 %  45.3 % 
win  draw  loss 
2.d4 – the risky Morra gambit 
2.c3 – the safer Alapin variation   8 
tends to be of utmost importance where one small mistake can alter the balance of the game in 
favor of the opponent. Risk averse strategies avoid many possible weaknesses but at the cost 
of fewer attacking possibilities. Usually, one slip in a solid position will not lose the game.  
The opening moves are “theoretical” and are memorized before the game, and, since no 
calculation is needed, these moves are played quickly. For each move, the opening theory 
covers the most reasonable moves by the opponent (typically 15-20 moves in depth).
10
In a game theoretical framework chess is a sequential game where the players make 
moves in turn. Figure 2 shows an opening to exemplify the grounds on which it is considered 
as risky or safe.  
 The 
definition of chess opening theory implies that the game remains in the saddle point 
equilibrium during the opening moves. This means that  as long as both players keep playing 
theoretical moves, there is no advantage for either side. For instance, if the theory of a certain 
opening variation lasts for twenty moves then the “real” play and a potential deviation from 
the saddle point equilibrium does not start until the 21
st move.   
 













After the first move for each side (1.e4 and 1...e6/1…c5), it is too early to classify the 
opening as being safe or risky.
11
                                                 
10 See Batsford’s Modern Chess Openings (2005).  
 In the first end-node of the game tree, white grabs space with 
11 To ease notation, the game tree only shows the possible strategies from the perspective of the player of the 
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safe   9 
3.e5, which will be used for an attack later on. In the second end-node, 3.exd5, white chooses 
a symmetric position without space advantage but avoiding weaknesses. In the third end-
node, 2.c3, white chooses a safer system, but in the fourth, 2.d4, a pawn is sacrificed to assure 
initiative and attack. If the pawn sacrifice does not result in a tangible advantage the opponent 
will eventually have greater winning probabilities than when the game started.   
There is a standardized classification of opening strategies, called the ECO codes. To 
create a risk measure, our aim is to be able to label each of the 500 openings as being either 
risky, neutral or safe. To obtain the labels for each opening we consulted eight chess experts 
of different skills with Elo rates ranging from 2000 to 2600, five men and three women, and 
asked them to give their opinion on the character of all the 500 Eco codes.
12 In more detail, 
they were instructed to define each opening as either risky, neutral or safe. We then compare 
the opinions of the experts and declare an Eco code to be risky, neutral or safe if at least six 
out of eight experts define it as either risky or safe.
13
 
 In cases when there are five or fewer 
votes for either risky or safe, the opening is considered to be neutral. As a result of our 
experts’ assessments, there are two labels for each game, one for the player of the white 
pieces and one for the black, i.e. one player may try to give the game a risky character while 
the other may try to keep it safe.  
Risk as measured by preferences for a draw 
A draw can be offered by a player and accepted or rejected by the opponent at any time 
during the game. Such an outcome alternative in real world games is very rare and the fact 
that it exists in chess makes the game suitable for studying risk behavior. There are no rules 
regulating the minimum number of moves that have to be played before the players can agree 
upon a draw except that the game must have started. We argue that, when controlling for 
differences in playing strength, two risk averse players have higher preferences for a draw 
                                                                                                                                                         
should be understood as: “the first move (1.) for black (…) and a pawn is moved to the coordinate e6.” In “exd5” 
x reads as “takes on.” 
12 According to the International Chess Federation (FIDE), a player is regarded as an expert if he/she has an Elo 
rating of 2000 or more. The lowest level required to obtain a Master title is a rating of 2300. A Grandmaster title 
usually implies an Elo rating of over 2500. In the year 1999 Garry Kasparov reached an Elo rating of 2851, the 
highest Elo rating ever measured. 
13 The reason for creating a binary (or actually “trinary”) variable and not a “continuous” variable ranging from 0 
to 10 is that the classification requires a very high level of expertise from the participating judges. Each of the 
judges needed several hours to complete the survey on the 500 opening codes and asking them to classify the 
openings on a broader scale would be unreasonable. Future work could explore this further.   10 
than two risk loving players as a draw gives half a point with certainty rather than playing for 
a win of one point with the risk of losing and getting zero points. For each additional move 
that is played in a game there is a risk for deviation from the saddle point equilibrium with a 
reduced probability for a draw. Expressed differently, if two equally skilled players have risk 
averse preferences they would reduce the risk by agreeing to a draw at an early stage. If one 
of two equally skilled players have made a mistake on the board the probability of a draw is 
lower than when the position is still in the saddle point equilibrium. Draws agreed to while 
still in the saddle point equilibrium are usually referred to as “arranged draws”. Since the 
players have not really started to play, arranged draws depend on the players’ preferences, 
while draws agreed to at a later stage, when the theory has ended, depends increasingly on the 
position on the chess board for each additional move. Thus, an arranged draw reflects the risk 
behavior a priori.  
By studying the probability for a draw compared to the probability of playing for a 
win with the risk of losing we obtain a measure of the drawing preferences. As has been 
argued above, risk averse players have higher preferences for draws while risk loving players 
prefer to play for a win. This proxy of risk behavior is likely to be stronger the earlier in the 
game the draw has been agreed to. For this reason we compare games ended in a draw with 
games ended in wins/losses for different game lengths in moves.  
Recapitulating, the first measure of risk is based on the choice of opening strategy 
which we quantified with the help of a small scale survey among eight expert chess players 
where 500 different opening strategies were classified as either risk averse, risk neutral or risk 
loving. The second measure is obtained by studying the preferences for agreeing to a draw. As 
this proxy measures the probability for choosing the expected payoff with certainty rather 
than gambling for a win with the risk of losing, we mean that it is a reasonable proxy for risk 
preferences.   
When it comes to  the empirical framework, the  questions addressed in this paper 
require different econometric models. All models estimated are using OLS. We look at three 
types of outcome variables: the type of opening (risky or non-risky), the performance of a 
chosen strategy, and whether the outcome is a draw.  When testing for the propensity of 
choosing an aggressive opening, the outcome variable is a binary dependent variable (coded 
as one or zero). When testing the performance of a chosen strategy  we include all three 
possible outcomes in chess, which are a win (1 point), a draw (½ point) and a loss (0 point). 
When testing for the propensity of the outcome being a draw, the outcome variable is binary 
(coded as one or zero).  The coefficients from the binary models are interpreted as the   11 
marginal probability for the outcome to occur. For the “trinary” outcome variable on 
performance, on the other hand, the coefficients are interpreted as the marginal gain in terms 
of so called “score points” as will be explained below.   
In the first set of regression estimations we look at how players in the MTurk-sample 
choose opening strategies, i.e. we look at the role of attractiveness for choosing an aggressive 
opening strategy, as well as the relationship between the level of attractiveness and the score 
points for a game. Subsequently, which is the focus of our analysis, we look at the behavior of 
chess players when playing against an opponent within the MTurk-sample. In the latter set of 
estimations we can control for aspects such as individual heterogeneity as well as differences 
in both opponents’ chess productivity. We thereafter explore the determinants of the outcome 
being a draw or not, testing whether this is affected by the attractiveness of the opponent.   
 
4   RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table  1  shows summary statistics for  the players that have been rated for  their physical 
attractiveness.  By design of the survey about half the players are women, and the age 
distribution is rather similar across gender. The share of male players from Western Europe is 
about 50 percent, while the corresponding number for female players is 30 percent. The share 
of players from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is about 50 percent for women 
and 25 for men. As for the rating on physical attractiveness, women are somewhat higher 
rated than the male players, but the difference is not significant. In Table A.0 in Appendix, we 
run regression estimations to see if it matters whether the rater is a woman or a man. In 
general, female raters are giving ratings that are 1.3 point higher than those of male raters, see 
column (1). The coefficient regarding the interaction of being a female rater and the sex of the 
rated player turns out to be insignificant, saying that female raters do not rate photos with 
female players differently than what male raters do.  
   12 
Table 1 – Mean values at the individual level for the MTurk-sample.
  All  Men  Women 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Risk averse OR  0.439    0.441    0.438   
Risk loving OR  0.222    0.234    0.210   
Female  0.498    0    1   
Attractiveness  6.077    (1.078)  5.775    (.936)  6.381      (1.126) 
Elo  2247.566  (142.665)  2302.921  (143.174)  2191.857  (118.597) 
Age  21.998  (2.777)  22.465  (2.583)  21.529  (2.888) 
Number of games 
played per year  26.003  (20.005)  27.829  (22.304)  24.165  (17.228) 
North America  0.030    0.035    0.026   
Latin America  0.056    0.038    0.074   
Nordic countries  0.042    0.048    0.035   
Western Europe*  0.358    0.471    0.244   
Eastern Europe  0.200    0.140    0.260   
fr Soviet Union  0.181    0.108    0.253   
N Africa /Mid 
East  0.026    0.029    0.022   
East Asia  0.083    0.086    0.080   
Africa  0.003    0.003    0.003   
Number of players  626    314    312   
Note: All mean values calculated on figures according to the period 1997 to 2007. * Net of Nordic 
countries. 
 
Estimation results: MTurk-sample only 
Table 2 and Table 3 show regression estimations where playing an aggressive opening is the 
dependent variable, for male and female players respectively. Only players from the MTurk-
sample are included. The aim is to look at the marginal importance of degree of attractiveness 
for ones choice of risky openings. Subsequently, a number of control variables are added to 
the estimations:  opponent playing risk averse strategy  Elo points at stake  and  Elo point 
differences. The first control variable addresses  the fact that women choose risk averse 
openings to a greater extent than men (as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix), which per se 
might trigger a player to respond by playing a  more risky strategy. The second control   13 
variable picks up the marginal amount of Elo points a player can gain by winning that game. 
Lastly, differences in Elo points are meant to hold constant the statistical chances of winning. 
As seen below, the regression coefficients regarding Attractiveness are rather stable across the 
different models estimated.  These results point to a positive correlation, though not 
significant, between physical attractiveness and the propensity of choosing a risky opening 
irrespective of gender. The impact seems more robust and slightly larger for male players. 
Notice that figures in column (4) in Table 2 and Table 3 report estimations where the control 
for Elo has been removed, just to test for the sensitivity of coefficients with respect to such 




                                                 
14  To see how attractive players perform when playing riskier strategies, we also run a regression with 
performance (score) as the outcome variable. The results are presented in Table A2 and A3 in appendix. The 
coefficient estimates suggest that there is no significant correlation between a player’s physical attractiveness 
and his/her performance.      14 
Table 2 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of physical attractiveness and playing against 
a woman on the choice of opening strategy for the players in the MTurk-sample. MEN. 
  Dependent variable: Choosing risky opening strategies, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No Elo 
control 
Attractiveness  0.0101  0.0103  0.0103  0.0101 
(0.0071)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)  (0.0065) 
Female opponent    0.0111  0.0139  0.0131 
  (0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0094) 
         
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  No  Yes  No 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  59 004  59 004  59 004  59 004 
Number of players  314  314  314  314 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample not restricted with 
respect to number of games played. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   15 
Table 3 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of physical attractiveness and playing against 
a woman on the choice of opening strategy for the players in the MTurk-sample. WOMEN. 
  Dependent variable: Choosing risky opening strategies, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No Elo 
control 
Attractiveness  0.0061  0.0066  0.0067  0.0070 
(0.0083)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076) 
Female opponent    -0.0076  -0.0089  -0.0099 
  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  (0.0068) 
         
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  No  Yes  No 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  48 234  48 234  48 234  48 234 
Number of players  312  312  312  312 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample not restricted with 
respect to number of games played. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Estimation results: the importance of meeting an attractive opponent 
So far we have been studying how the players in the MTurk-sample choose opening 
strategies. Next, we look at how other players interact with the MTurk-sample, i.e. we analyze 
what strategies other players choose when they meet players from the MTurk-sample. We 
focus especially on the physical attractiveness ratings of the MTurk-players.  
Summary statistics for the sample used in the regression estimations are shown in 
Table 4. In this section only games where the opponent is one of the 626 players in the 
MTurk-sample are included. The variable “Result”, already used in the estimations above, 
indicates the score that is achieved in a chess game. A chess game can result in a win, draw, 
or loss, which gives 1, 0.5, or 0 points respectively. The average outcome should be 0.5 if 
both players in each game would be included in the sample. Here the mean values do not sum 
up exactly to 0.5, which is due to the fact that in the estimations we have conditioned on the   16 
player (but not his or her opponent) having a record of more than 20 games over the total time 
period studied. As some of the opponents in the MTurk sample do not fulfill this condition, 
the aggregated scores do not sum up to 0.5. Below we will use the score of a game  in 
estimations where we test for the rationality of playing risky openings.  
 
Table 4 – Mean values at game level for the sample used in the estimations. 
  All  Men  Women 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Risk-averse OR  0.462    0.465    0.457   
Risk loving OR  0.214    0.216    0.211   
Elo score  2355.843  (159.440)  2397.266  (153.681)  2261.123  (129.032) 
Age  29.251  (11.503)  31.250  (11.895)  24.679  (9.018) 
Aged max 20 in 
%  0.285    0.220    0.435   
Number of games 
played per year   39.544  (29.954)  41.457  (32.245)  35.171  (23.323) 
North America  0.030    0.034    0.019   
Latin America  0.037    0.043    0.022   
Nordic countries  0.050    0.061    0.025   
Western Europe*  0.321    0.370    0.211   
Eastern Europe  0.259    0.235    0.315   
fr Soviet Union  0.234    0.189    0.337   
N Africa /Mid 
East  0.018    0.018    0.016   
East Asia  0.042    0.038    0.053   
Africa  0.001    0.001    0.001   
Result  0.476  (0.397)  0.484  (0.395)  0.458  (0.402) 
             
Number of games  101 024    70 286    30 738   
Number of players  11 107    9 848    1 259   
Note: All mean values calculated on figures according to the period 1997 to 2007. * Net of Nordic 
countries. Observations for those included in regression estimations. Sample with 20 or more games played 
during the period studied. 
   17 
In Table 5 and Table 6 below we explore the importance of the opponent’s gender as well as 
his or her physical attractiveness in the estimations. Column (1) in Table 5 and Table 6 shows 
how male/female  players are choosing openings when meeting one of the players in the 
MTurk-sample. The focus here is on the marginal impact of meeting a female opponent. The 
coefficient estimate on playing against a female is insignificant for both men and women. In 
column (2) the measure of the opponent’s physical attractiveness is added to the model, which 
only has a minor  impact on the female opponent variable. Things change significantly, 
however, once we include an interaction term of the gender of the opponent and his or her 
rating of physical attractiveness, at least when it comes to the behavior of male players, as 
shown in column (3) in Table 5. There is thus evidence that playing against a more attractive 
female player leads to a larger propensity of choosing aggressive openings if the player is a 
man. For female players, on the other hand, the behavior does not show sensitivity to such 
aspects, see column (3) in Table 6. Here one should notice that women play against other 
female players far more often than what men do, i.e. female players meet one player of the 
same sex in about 94 of 100 games, while the corresponding figure for male players is ca 77 
out of 100 games.
15
                                                 
15 These numbers have to be interpreted with caution. By design there are about equally many women as men in 
the MTurk-sample. As we condition on playing against one of the players in that sample, the share of games 
against an opponent of the same sex is pushed upwards (downwards) for women (men). There are two types of 
tournaments in chess: mixed and all-female. This means that female players have access to a greater variety of 
tournaments than male players. It could be the case that women condition on the degree of competitive play 
when choosing tournaments, i.e. some women might choose tournaments where they mostly meet other (risk 
averse) female players. This would imply that those women competing in tournaments where they meet male 
players are relatively more competitive than other female players. To what extent this has an impact on the found 
non-significance of conditioning risky play against more attractive female opponents is not clear. 
 In column (4) in both tables we show estimations where we do not 
control for individual fixed effects. The estimates change slightly, and the coefficient for the 
impact of playing against attractive female opponents becomes smaller. The interaction effect 
of playing aggressively  against a  female opponent is determined by two aspects:  the 
coefficient on female opponent and the coefficient on attractiveness and female opponent. 
Thus, according to column (3) in Table 5 the interaction effect reads -0.0765+attractiveness 
rate of the female opponent*0.0123. Using the mean value of attractiveness for the female 
sample, which is 6.57, the average effect becomes 0.0043. In case we use the top (lower) 




 From Table 4 we see that on average male players chose a risky opening 
in 21.4 percent of all games. When comparing that value with our found estimate of playing 
against a female opponent in the top decile of the MTurk-sample of female players in terms of 
attractiveness, there is thus a marginal increase of about 10 percent. 
Table 5 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of 
opening when controlling for the opponent’s physical attractiveness. MEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing risky opening strategies, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No fixed 
effects 







(0.0222)**   





(0.0019)     
Attractiveness and female 
opponent 
    0.0123  0.0081 
    (0.0040)***  (0.0035)** 
         
Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  70 286  70 286  70 286  70 286 
Number of players  9 848  9 848  9 848  9 848 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
                                                 
16 By the setup of the model we measure the average interaction effect. In general there could be non-linear 
patterns in the way female attractiveness affect playing style, an aspect we leave for future research.   19 
Table 6 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of playing against a woman on the choice of 
opening when controlling for the opponent’s physical attractiveness. WOMEN. 
Dependent variable: Choosing risky opening strategies, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No fixed 
effects 







(0.0615)   





(0.0103)     
Attractiveness and female 
opponent 
    0.0012  -0.0027 
    (0.0103)  (0.0105) 
         
Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30 738  30 738  30 738  30 738 
Number of players  1 259  1 259  1 259  1 259 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
As we saw above, for men there is a higher propensity of choosing aggressive 
openings when playing against more attractive female opponents. One could argue that such 
behavior could be rational if it would lead to positive outcomes in terms of performance. In 
Table 7 and 8 we scrutinize this issue. For that purpose we look at the score points gained in 
each game, where a win, draw, or loss, results in 1, 0.5, or 0 points respectively. The model 
includes a number of interaction terms to catch all kind of cross-mechanisms that are related 
to the gender and attractiveness of the opponent. The interaction variable of main interest is 
the one marked in bold type, which states the marginal impact of playing aggressive openings 
against a female opponent, interacted by the level of her physical attractiveness. The estimates 
are not significant, but the overall trend is rather stable, suggesting that if anything, that   20 
playing a risky opening against more attractive female opponents comes with a cost. Thus, 
combining the results from Table 5 with those in Table 7 show that the behavior of men 
cannot be regarded as rational. 
For women, we also see that there is a no benefit to play more aggressively against 
more attractive female opponents, see Table 8. However, as women do not seem to condition 
their choice of opening on the attractiveness of their opponent (as we saw in Table 6) there is 
no evident irrationality in their play. Excluding individual fixed-effects (see column 4 in 
Table 7 and Table 8) to some extent changes the estimates of interest. This suggests that 
heterogeneity across individuals with respect to time-constant aspects (for example cultural 




                                                 
17 When using individual fixed effects the coefficient estimates are identified only by changes in the variables 
over all games played by each player. In other words, in such estimations a game played by two players has 
different impact for the estimations as each of the players has a different personal record of games over time. 
When we do not  control for individual fixed effects, however, each game counts as (two) self-contained 
observations, which will force the performance outcome to its mean value of 0.5. The latter point might explain 
some of the downward bias of the coefficient estimates in column (4) compared with column (3).   21 
Table 7 – OLS estimations regarding the probability of scoring when using a risky strategy 
against female opponents. MEN. 
Dependent variable: The score achieved in a game 
        no fixed 
effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Playing risky  -0.0440  -0.0171  -0.0152  -0.0187 
(0.0276)  (0.0263)  (0.0259)  (0.0226) 
Female opponent  0.2696  0.0931  0.0601  0.0556 
(0.0280)***  (0.0270)***  (0.0265)**  (0.0225)** 
Play risky against female 
opponent 
0.1168  0.0638  0.0430  0.0252 
(0.0613)*  (0.0591)  (0.0584)  (0.0494) 




























Play risky against female 











Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  70 286  70 286  70 286  70 286 
Numb. of players  9 848  9 848  9 848  9 848 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 – OLS estimations regarding the probability of scoring when using an aggressive 
strategy against female opponents. WOMEN. 
Dependent variable: The score achieved in a game 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        no fixed 
effects 
Playing risky  -0.1344  -0.1721  -0.1856  -0.1251 
(0.1241)  (0.1228)  (0.1254)  (0.1229) 
Female opponent  0.1941  0.0194  -0.0315  -0.0124 
(0.0639)***  (0.0605)  (0.0613)  (0.0580) 
Play risky against female 
opponent 
0.1613  0.1492  0.1554  0.0823 
(0.1311)  (0.1290)  (0.1313)  (0.1281) 




























Play risky against female 











Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30 738  30 738  30 738  30 738 
Numb. of players  1 259  1 259  1 259  1 259 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 3 displays the results when using the second proxy of risk behavior. It shows 
the estimated coefficients from regressions with different game lengths, i.e. games that ended 
in 1-20 moves, 1-25 moves, …, 1-80 moves.
18 There are not many games ending in a win/loss 
in fewer than twenty moves. As was explained in the previous section, this follows as the 
theory maintains the saddle point equilibrium until approximately the 15
th to 20
th move. The 
strongest result for men is seen for games ended in less than 35 moves. As we argued, this is 
due to the fact a player’s reaction, when confronting an attractive woman, is likely to occur in 
the beginning of the game. When the position becomes more complicated it is more likely that 
the status of the game, and not the players, will influence the choice of strategy. In games 
ended in less than 35 moves, we find that men, when playing against attractive female 
opponents, use a more risky strategy compared to when playing against less attractive female 
opponents. For this game length, the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level of significance. The right chart in Figure 3 shows the corresponding results for 
women when they play against attractive female opponents. There are no significant 




                                                 
18 In Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5 we give the results for draws in 1-35 moves.  
19 However, there is a weak growing tendency for women becoming somewhat more risk averse when playing 
against attractive female opponents the longer the games are.   24 
Figure 3 – Estimated coefficients with dependent variable =1 if draw, =0 if win/loss for 
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Notes: Estimations controlling for individual fixed effects
Other control variables as in Table 5 and 6, column(3). Standard errors clustered on individual level
Coefficient estimates. Upper and lower bound indicating 95% confidence interval
Attractive female opponent, draw as dependent variable
 
 
Concluding the results, we find that both approaches used to proxy risk behavior show 
that men become more risk loving when playing against attractive female opponents. The 
estimation results based on our first measure show that men choose riskier opening strategies 
when playing against an attractive female opponent compared to when playing against a less 
attractive female opponent. The results from the second measure suggest that men have higher 
preferences for the riskier strategy (playing for a win with the risk of losing rather than 
accepting a draw) when playing against more attractive female opponents.     25 
5   DISCUSSION 
The most robust gender difference in economic behavior has been found for risk preferences, 
where men typically take more risk than women (Croson and Gneezy 2009, Eckel and 
Grossman  2008). A number of factors have been suggested for this, including biological 
variables (e.g. Apicella et al. 2008, Dreber and Hoffman 2010, though see Zethraeus et al. 
2009 for evidence not supporting this explanation)  as well as cultural variables such as 
whether girls behave differently depending on if they attend mixed or same sex schools (e.g. 
Booth and Nolen 2009). These studies typically rely on experimentally elicited risk 
preferences through gambles, where decisions mainly are made in isolation from other 
individuals. 
In this study we explore to what extent performance and risk taking are affected by the 
attractiveness of the opponent in chess games. We find that men, but not women, take more 
risk in chess against more attractive opponents of the opposite gender. Moreover, this elevated 
risk taking is  not  beneficial for performance: if anything it is instead costly since the 
coefficient is rather stable and mostly negative.
20
With a high number of observations, and players from a broad range of countries 
together with a large battery of controls, including fixed effects, these results add to the 
literature by showing that people, and especially men, may behave differently depending on 
the degree of physical attractiveness of the counterpart. These  effects  could certainly be 
present in various situations in the labor market.  
 The fact that we find similar pattern with 
both risk measures increases the reliability of the findings. One could argue that time 
preferences interact with the risk effect. However, the first measure is expected to be 
positively correlated with time preferences (playing risky may shorten the game through a 
quick win/loss) whereas the second measure is expected to be negatively correlated with time 
preferences (accepting a draw now rather than playing for a win should lead to a quicker 
result). This reduces the likelihood that time preferences are driving the results. 
That men and not women change their behavior when playing against an attractive 
opponent of the opposite gender is in line with some previous results. Wilson and Daly (2004) 
show that men become more impulsive when viewing an attractive woman compared to a less 
attractive woman, whereas this effect is not observed for women looking at pictures of men. 
                                                 
20 Van den Bergh et al. (2008) find no negative impact of sexual cues on male performance in a word task and 
hence no evidence of sexual cues affecting cognitive load. Whether the presence of attractive women affect 
cognitive load among male chess players in a way that is not related to sexual cues remain to be explored.   26 
Landry et al. (2006) find that for door-to-door charitable fundraising, men respond more to 
female solicitor attractiveness than women do. Bertrand et al. (2010) find that including an 
attractive woman in an ad for loans has an equally large effect on men on take up as lowering 
the interest rate by 25 percent, whereas women do not react to seeing an attractive man or 
woman. Our results are also related to those of Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) who find that 
men are more willing to take more sexual risk when sexually aroused.
21
We see several lines of promising extensions of this work. An interesting study would 
be to test whether the impact of an attractive female opponent is the same for a man in a field 
that is less male-dominated than chess. Another extension would be to see if attractiveness as 
measured from seeing an individual in person rather than in a photo  gives a stronger or 
weaker behavioral effect than attractiveness ratings measured from photos. There are also 
other facial characteristics to study, such as facial masculinity, which has been found to 
correlate with risk taking in a male sample (Apicella et al. 2008). It would also be interesting 
to compare ratings from head shots with those of full body pictures.  
 Sexual risk taking 
and using a risky strategy in chess are obviously not the same thing, but we speculate that 
there is an underlying reward circuitry that is activated by both attractive women and sexual 
cues or explicit sexual images that influences risky behaviors. 
It could turn out that playing a risky strategy against an attractive female player is 
beneficial for a male player outside of the chess game. To what extent this is the case could be 
explored by for example combining our data with interviews of the players where after their 
games they are asked about how impressed they were by their opponent’s play and also 
whether they experienced any flirtation. It would also be interesting to know if men realize 
they are being riskier when they see an attractive woman; and what effect teaching them about 
it has on behavior. Finally, we think that another interesting extension would focus on gender 
composition, attractiveness and risk taking in different domains than chess, such as inside a 
trading room or in a corporate board room. 
 
                                                 
21 It would be interesting to see whether sexual arousal also extends to more risk taking in other domains. 
Moreover, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) only look at male subjects. It remains to be shown how women’s 
decision making related to risk taking reacts to sexual arousal.   27 
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Ross, Daniel. “Arpad Elo and the Elo Rating System”: 




The average share of female raters across 
questionnaires 
  Percentiles  Smallest   
1%  .429  .429   
25%  .551     
Media
n  .596  Mean value  .595 
    Std. Dev.  .064 
       
75%  .64  Largest          
99%  .735  .735          
     
 
The average age of the raters across questionnaires 
  Percentiles  Smallest   
1%  32.5  32.5   
25%  34.196     
Media
n  35.178  Mean value  35.167 
    Std. Dev.  1.278 
       
75%  36.087  Largest          
99%  38.128  38.12766          
 
Obs  61 questionnaires   
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Table A.0 – OLS estimations regarding rater characteristics on attractiveness ratings. 
  Dependent variable: Attractiveness of MTurk-players 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















Female player    0.6068  0.4992 
    (0.0733)***  (0.5990) 
       
Interaction share of female 
raters and being female 
player 
    0.1812 
(1.0095) 
     
Observations  626  626  626 
R-squared  0.007  0.086  0.086 
Number of questionnaire  61  61  61 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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Table A.1 - OLS estimations regarding gender differences in playing opening strategies.  
  Dependent variable: 
   risk averse opening strategy  risk loving opening strategy 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Elo 
 
0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
(0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
Female 
 
0.0206  -0.0061  -0.0253  -0.0112 
(0.0096)**  (0.0158)  (0.0071)***  (0.0114) 
Age 
 
0.0045  0.0047  -0.0055  -0.0056 
(0.0015)***  (0.0015)***  (0.0011)***  (0.0011)*** 
Age squared 
 
-0.0000  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
Age max 20 
 
0.0020  0.0024  -0.0039  -0.0036 
(0.0089)  (0.0089)  (0.0072)  (0.0072) 
Log (number of 
games played) 
0.0032  0.0037  -0.0029  -0.0032 
(0.0038)  (0.0037)  (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
North America  
female 
  0.0491 
(0.0443) 
  0.0223 
(0.0517)     
Latin America  
female 
  0.0007 
(0.0369) 
  -0.0546 
(0.0271)**     
Nordic countries  
female 
  0.0968 
(0.0349)*** 
  -0.0734 
(0.0219)***     
East Europe  
female 
  0.0294 
(0.0229) 
  -0.0087 
(0.0166)     
Former Soviet Union  
female 
  0.0249 
(0.0222) 
  -0.0146 
(0.0171)     
North Africa/ Middle 
East female 
  0.0747 
(0.0529) 
  -0.0936 
(0.0416)**     
East Asia  
female 
  0.1028 
(0.0373)*** 
  -0.0499 
(0.0252)**     
Africa  
female 
  -0.2140 
(0.0933)** 
  -0.0159 
(0.1216)     
Observations  101 024  101024  101 024  101024   32 
Number of players  11 107  11107  11 107  11107 
Note: Nationality controls are: North America, Latin America, Nordic countries, East Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, North Africa/Middle-East, East Asia, Africa, with Western Europe as comparison. Year 
dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Sample with 20 or more 
games played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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In Table A.2 and A.3 below we show estimations for the same sample as in Table 2 and 3, but 
here the outcome variable is performance in terms of score points. Overall, the coefficient 
estimates suggest that there is no association between a player’s physical attractiveness and 
his/her performance. 
 
Table A.2 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of physical attractiveness on performance. 
MEN. 
  Dependent variable: The score achieved in a game 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No Elo 
control 
Attractiveness  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0028  -0.0021 
(0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0020)  (0.0018) 
Female opponent    0.1305  0.0120  0.0144 
  (0.0098)***  (0.0083)  (0.0083)* 
         
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Indicator opponent playing 
Solid  
No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  No  Yes  No 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  59 004  59 004  59 004  59 004 
Number of players  314  314  314  314 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample not restricted with 
respect to number of games played. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.3 – OLS estimations regarding the impact of physical attractiveness on performance. 
WOMEN. 
  Dependent variable: The score achieved in a game 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        No Elo 
control 
Attractiveness  0.0009  0.0001  0.0010  0.0003 
(0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0019)  (0.0018) 
Female opponent    0.0971  0.0043  0.0065 
  (0.0054)***  (0.0044)  (0.0043) 
Individual fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Indicator opponent playing 
Solid  
No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  No  No  Yes  No 
Elo differences  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  48 234  48 234  48 234  48 234 
Number of players  312  312  312  312 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample not restricted with 
respect to number of games played. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.4 – Example estimations with dependent variable 1 if draw in 1-35 moves, 0 if 
win/loss in 1-35 moves. MEN. 
Dependent variable: Draw in 1-35 moves, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        no fixed 
effects 







(0.0452)*   





(0.0037)     
Attractiveness and female 
opponent 
    -0.0232  -0.0189 
    (0.0097)**  (0.0071)*** 
         
Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  27 558  27 558  27 558  27 558 
Number of players  7 126  7 126  7 126  7 126 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.5 – Example estimations with dependent variable 1 if draw in 1-35 moves, 0 if 
win/loss in 1-35 moves. WOMEN. 
Dependent variable: Draw in 1-35 moves, yes (1) or no (0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        no fixed 
effects 







(0.1297)   





(0.0219)     
Attractiveness and female 
opponent 
    -0.0026  0.0063 
    (0.0252)  (0.0226) 
         
Individual fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Opponent playing risk averse 
strategy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo points at stake  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Elo differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10 095  10 095  10 095  10 095 
Number of players  1 142  1 142  1 142  1 142 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. Other control variables are Elo, age, 
age squared, age_max_20, log (number of games played), year dummies. Sample with 20 or more games 
played during the period studied. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 